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Abstract 
A pure land tax is market neutral because of being entirely paid by lowering prices in land 
supplied to the market; however it is an almost unattainable public policy objective. A Land 
Value Development Tax (LVDT) may be an alternative possibility, when levied where 
regulatory or infrastructural state interventions determine land prices increases. Even when 
the LVDT is still paid by means of a lowering of land prices (static neutrality), it might 
accelerate development timing (non-dynamic neutrality), and it can also have price increasing 
spatial feedback effects when not applied on all the spatial units of a region. We examine the 
LVDT applied in Bogotá (Colombia) during 2004-2010. This city offers an excellent 
opportunity for policy assessment since it has both a clearly determined pre and post-tax 
period, and spatial differences in application. This paper uses spatial panels to assess the 
LVDT impact on prices. We found that the LVDT had a negative effect on prices while not 
having any building output, or spatial feedback effects. The results allow us to conclude that 
the LVDT fulfils the static and dynamic neutrality conditions of a Pure Land Tax in spite of 
its scattered spatial implementation.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Although there has been a long tradition of land use planning in Latin America, it is argued 
that much of this policy has used inappropriate enforcement, land use regulation that favours 
the elite in societies, and has exhibited a lack of attention to formal economic planning tools. 
In this paper, we address these concerns by making a spatial urban economics analysis of the 
Colombian Value Capture strategy: Captura de Plusvalía. 
 
Captura de Plusvalía is a Land Value Development Tax (LVDT) that attempts to reduce 
unearned landowner gains. In particular, it is intended to capture windfall gains due to 
infrastructural or regulatory interventions in the urban space. This LVDT was introduced in 
national legislation in 1997 (Law 388) following a constitutional principle (Article 81 – 
Constitution of 1991). However, these constitutional and legal principles have been 
implemented slowly, mainly because of political resistance. We consider that lack of formal 
assessment of its achieved results is one reason for this resistance and one rationale for 
undertaking this case study. 
 
We use information for the period 2000-2010 to assess the land market neutrality of the 
LVDT of Bogota, Colombia’s capital and largest metropolis. This city introduced the LVDT 
in 2004, and offers an excellent vantage point for observation of its effects, because it follows 
a clear spatial and temporal application process, it is applied over an extended metropolitan 
area regulated by a single master plan throughout all the years of application of the tax, it 
comprises a single public authority for revenue and taxation purposes, and there has been no 
previous historical experience with the use of this type of land exaction in the city or region. 
These characteristics allow us to test the effects of an LVDT in an emerging urban 
environment, using single and multi-equation spatial panel techniques.  
 
The paper uses spatial panel estimation where the land prices will depend on spatial and 
socio-economic variables extracted from urban land economics theory, and as a function of 
the LVDT rate per year and zones. It will be shown that the LVDT rate had a negative impact 
on land prices per year while not affecting corresponding building output per year. These 
results strongly suggest that the LVDT is market neutral, both in a static and a dynamic sense, 
a result in line with existing theory. 
 
The paper is structured in six sections, the first being this introduction, while in the second 
we present a contextual and empirical literature review. In section three, we set an empirical 
framework for assessment while in the fourth section we introduce the case study and 
databases. The relevant empirical analyses are performed and presented in section five, while 
section six sets out our conclusions and policy assessment. 
 
 
2. LAND TAXATION: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL INQUIRIES 
 
2.1 Land Taxation and Spatial Markets  
 
A Pure Land Tax is often considered the ideal source for public finance. This is because the 
perfectly inelastic supply of land allows the spatial land rents and land use structures as 
determined by market forces to remain once the tax is collected (Wildasin, 1988; Anas, 
Arnott and Small, 1998). This characteristic has been analysed and theoretically 
demonstrated by following the so-called Henry George Theorem under different market and 
spatial structures (Arnot and Stiglitz, 1979).  
 
However, a Pure Land Tax has been an almost unattainable ideal because of legal resistance 
to valuations and procedures, or political power held by landowners. The split rate tax, a 
variation of the pure land tax, was used in the city of Pittsburgh. Oates and Schwab (1997), 
and Plassman and Tideman (2000) found that this policy was market-neutral, as theoretically 
expected. 
 
In spite of its advantages, the Pure Land Tax has not been widely used around the world. By 
comparison, the Land Value Development Tax (LVDT) has been an option that has led to 
less resistance, even though it might not necessarily share all the benefits of a Pure Land Tax. 
The LVDT tries to re-capture for the local government the land prices increases due to 
regulatory or infrastructural interventions. However, even where it can be statically market-
neutral, it may also delay or accelerate development timing and, thus, not respect dynamic 
neutrality. 
 According to Rose (1973, 1976), if we analyse the LVDT as a one-time exaction to the 
instantly increased present value of future rents (the new land price) in a location subject ot 
intervenion, the development timing of the corresponding plot of land might be a function of 
the tax rate and, in that sense, the tax would not respect dynamic market neutrality.  
 
The work of Rose has been contested by Neutze (1974), and Foster and Glaister (1975). 
These authors considered that the choice of a specific functional form for the present value of 
rents produces an effect from the tax rate to the development timing. Another flow of 
criticisms came from Evans (1983) and Needham (1983), because landowners’ strikes may 
allow for the passing on of the tax to final land users via land holding1. 
 
The dynamic neutrality of both the LVDT and the pure land tax can also fail if not all the 
spatial units inside a region apply it, that is, a spatial general equilibrium feedback effect 
(Brueckner, 1986). This effect occurs when the tax is applied in a spatial unit but not in its 
neighbours, meaning that the static-neutral land price decrease can be counterbalanced by 
development migration from other neighbouring spatial units. There will be land price 
increases after the scattered spatial application of the tax. 
  
The application of both pure land taxes and LVDTs has been resisted in Latin America, 
possibly because of its rural and landowner-biased political traditions (Sokoloff, 2012). 
Regardless of these limitations, Brazil and Colombia have recently implemented value-
capture strategies, in a context full of controversies. 
 
The Brazilian value-capture strategy is named Solo Criado (Created Land) and it gives 
freedom to build the first floor in one’s property without any charges, but the government 
captures 100% of land price increases caused by building additional floors (Fernandes, 2011). 
Unfortunately there is scarce literature on the effects of this policy and, in particular, we still 
do not have a spatial, time controlled, metropolitan scale, and land oriented assessment. 
 
                                                            
1 As one of the referees noted, landowners might also withhold land in anticipation of a legal or tax change in 
favour of their position. This falls outside the scope of this paper, although parallel work examining land 
monopoly effects addresses similar issues.  
The Colombian value-capture is named Captura de Plusvalia, and it is an LVDT. It is set out 
in Law 388 of 1997, the current planning framework for this country. The Law states that all 
of its 1,038 municipalities need a Master Plan including the use of value-capture tools. The 
LVDT has been used only in the cities of Bogota, Medellin and Pereira, but it has proven to 
be operationally demanding and politically/legally resisted (Borrero and Duran, 2010). 
 
2.2 Value Capture Assessments 
 
Formal assessments of the Value Capture in Brazil or Colombia have been scarce, although 
we should recognize the pioneering effort by Borrero (2007) for Bogotá. Our analysis relies 
heavily on his pioneering contribution; however, our test framework is an improvement as 
that paper  was unable to use time and spatial controls, properly specified test models, and 
metropolitan scale analysis. In addition, our information is public and controlled by 
geographic and social features. 
 
In the international literature, we are very much aligned with the works of Ihlandfeldt and 
Shaughnessy (2004), and Ihlanfeldt (2007), as they use a full metropolitan scale urban 
economy model to test a land exaction strategy (the Impact Fee). But contrary to these 
authors, we do not assume a specific land price spatial function (they assume a cubic spline) 
and our time dimension allows us to use a ‘change’ in regulation approach and not a simple 
‘levels’ of regulation approach (McLaughlin, 2012). 
 
Lauridsen et al. (2013) is another precedent to our own research, as they use prices collected 
over time in relation to regulation and land tax in 25 municipalities in Denmark. They use 
housing price per city and regulatory variables impacting price in a spatial perspective. But 
these authors are not working with land prices (instead using house prices as a proxy), and 
their focus is on regulation not the land tax, which nonetheless, appears to have the expected 
negative impact on prices. 
 
Bachis et al. (2012), constitutes our most immediate precedent as they assess the impact of a 
Land Transfer Tax (LTT) on housing sales within a Toronto suburb by using a Difference-in-
Differences (DiD) estimation. The authors found that the tax had the effect of decreasing land 
prices although it was not market-neutral since transaction volumes slowed down. However, 
and due to their different research objectives, their transactions of fully developed properties 
mask the land prices that we directly analyse using appraisals.  
 
It should be added that the income regressiveness or progressiveness, r and the incidence, of 
land taxes remain a contentious issue. In consolidated urban environments there can be ‘asset 
rich but income poor’ situations, but in fast expanding cities (like those in Latin America) 
those profiting the most from urban growth may be pure landowners. Experiments with pure 
land taxation in developing countries cities have been carried out in Mexicali (Delgado and 
Perló, 2000), and Johannesburg (Franzsen, 2005). 
 
All of these are valuable contributions; however we consider that the existing literature has 
not offered a more conclusive answer to the question surrounding the neutrality (static and 
dynamic) of the LVDT because they lack  a case study with clear and comparable 
information pre and post-tax period. There is also scant research about this subject with a 
spatial, and metropolitan-scale perspective, while it is evident that there is lack of knowledge 
about this subject in developing countries. The combination of these characteristics is a 
contribution of this paper to the literature on urban economics and land exactions.  
 
 
3. AN EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSMENT 
 
In this section we follow the determinants of land rents in a city where land rent in each zone 
݅ is a residual after discounting building costs. Differences in regulatory restrictions per zone 
imply higher land rents in the zones where the restrictions are less strong than the citywide 
standards. Basically, the higher the Floor-to-Area-Ratio (FAR), the higher the land rent:  
 ݎ௜ ൌ ݍ௜ሺ ௜ܲ െ ܿሻܮ௜ ܨܣܴ௜                                           (1)
where ݎ௜= residual Land Rent (Price) per m2, ݍ௜ Building Output quantity in m2, ௜ܲ Price of 
the building environment per m2, ܿ Construction costs per m2, ܮ௜ Total available land in the 
zone in m2, and ܨܣܴ௜ as average per zone.  
 
According to Rose (1973), a correctly designed LVDT is market-neutral in a static sense; we 
simply have to discount its value from the equation (1). The tax base is the change in land 
rents due to government intervention, a theoretical condition that cannot be observed in a 
citywide analysis such as our case study. This is why we have to use the price change per 
zone.  We have for every zone ݅ and every period ݐ:  
 ݎ௜௧ ൌ ݍ௜௧ሺ ௜ܲ௧ െ ܿ௧ሻܮ௜௧ ܨܣܴ௜ െ ߬௜௧ሺݎ௜௧ െ ݎ௜௧ିଵሻ                             (2)
Where ߬௜௧	is the tax rate per zone and period, and ሺݎ௜௧ െ ݎ௜௧ିଵሻ is the land price change per 
zone between periods (which includes what accrued due to public intervention). By taking 
logarithms on both sides we have: 
 ݈݊ݎ௜௧ ൌ ݈݊ݍ௜௧ ൅ ݈݊ሺ ௜ܲ௧ െ ܿ௧ሻ ൅ ݈݊ܨܣܴ௜ െ ݈݊ܮ௜௧ െ ݈݊߬௜௧ ൅ ݈݊ሺ∆ݎ௜௧ሻ          (3)
 
Equation (3) represents a panel estimation model where ݎ௜௧ is also dependent on location. 
This is why we will require a pure cross-section variable representing distance to be 
introduced as a function (gradient or spline) of distance ሺܦ௜ሻ: 
 
 ݈݊ݎ௜௧ ൌ ݈݊ݍ௜௧ ൅ ݈݊ሺ ௜ܲ௧ െ ܿ௧ሻ ൅ ݈݊ܨܣܴ௜ െ ݈݊ܮ௜௧ െ ݈݊߬௜௧ ൅ ݈݊ሺ∆ݎ௜௧ሻ െ ݈݊ܦ௜          (4)
 
Equation (4) represents a panel model that will permit us to determine if the relationship 
between the tax rate and the land prices per UPZ is negative, evidence of static market 
neutrality. It will also allow us to check the possibility of dynamic non-neutrality, by 
analysing the interrelationships between the tax rate, the land prices, and the building output. 
The information sources and methodology to accomplish this test are presented in the next 
section. 
 
4. CASE STUDY AND DATA 
 
This paper analyses the LDVT applied in Bogota during the period 2004-20102. This city 
started LVDT processes in 2004, with a tax rate that increased from 30% in that year, to 40% 
in 2005, and 50% from 2006 onwards. Its base is the land value increase due to regulatory 
and/or infrastructural changes and it has been implemented piecemeal citywide following a 
spatial and temporal pattern that can be considered random (not guided by any policy or 
                                                            
2 Bogota  is the largest Colombian urban area (7,100,000 inhabitants), with one of its highest GDP per capita 
(11,565 US$ for 2011), and the main node for air transport, finance and services in the country. The city is 
located on a plateau 2,600 metres above sea level, and comprises approximately 36,000 hectares of built 
environment. It is limited to the east by the Andes mountain range and to the west by the River Bogota, with a 
north-south orientation and the downtown located towards the south-east, close to the mountains in the left panel 
of Map 1.  
 
geographical principle)3. Its adoption rate has been determined by legal-urban rulings relating 
to the so-called Spatial Planning Units (UPZs).  
 
There are 117 UPZs determined by the 2000Master Plan; they have an average land area of 
375 hectares, and have required micro-planning legal/cadastral/geographic reports before 
being incorporated into the actions considered by the plan. Inside these reports, when 
development permission is requested, the value-capture processes are carried out. They 
include appraisals at block (or part block) level wherever an area is considered to be 
positively affected by regulatory or infrastructural interventions4. The UPZs are presented in 
the left panel of Map 1.  
[Map 1 about here] 
 
This case offers a good opportunity for assessment because we can explicitly track the 
appearance of the LVDT and its spatial application in different zones within the same city, 
with the same collection authority, and regulated by the same master plan. All of these are 
characteristics difficult to find in first world countries where the LVDTs have had longer 
traditions, and the applications have occurred in extended metropolitan areas with divided 
planning jurisdictions and collection authorities. In the next sections we will present our 
information sources, and the procedures that we have accomplished to adapt them into a 
single and comparable database to perform panel estimation of equation (4) per UPZs. 
 
4.1 Land Prices per M2 
 
The land prices per M2 used in this research are taken from the publications of the Local 
Surveyors and Real Estate Business Association named Lonja de Propiedad Raíz de Bogota. 
The spatial distribution of land prices (constant COP$ 2012) is presented in the right panel of 
Map 1. 
 
                                                            
3 No one interviewed in the city government or academia claims to know why certain areas of the city have been 
subject to value-capture processes, while some others have been neglected. The guiding principle looks like a 
‘first-come-first-served’ where development permissions requests after the enactment of the LVDT 
determined their inclusion in the strategy. 
4 Some critics argue that the strategy has been expensive to implement and it does not pay its own collection 
costs. Vejarano (2007) has shown that it has already more than paid these costs, and moreover, collection is 
not the reason for having created it in the first place.  
Lonja produces an annual book that reports land prices per zone for different land uses in the 
city. It was first published in 1988 and yearly since then and onwards and constitutes a 
unique source of information in the Latin American context5. This information is based upon 
appraisals that all of the Lonja associates make during the corresponding year, and it is 
classified by zone. In the left panel of Map 1 we represent the Lonja Zones, their type, 
location and extension, against the background of the already introduced 117 city UPZs.  
 
The  use of appraisals in real estate research has sometimes been criticized, since it is argued 
that they tend to lag market prices, miss turning points and smooth out volatility6. More 
recently, Devaney (2014) did not find particular advantages in the use of transaction-based 
information when compared with appraisal-based information for a range of European 
markets.  The bulk of work on smoothing has focussed on commercial real estate indices. 
Sirmans and Slade (2011) have found that transactions-based land price indices for the USA 
Granger cause S&P/Case-Schiller and the Davis-Heathcote/Lincoln Institute series. The 
Lonja values are based on evidence of observed land transactions in the area: we would note 
that one of the original formulations of the smoothing issue, Quan & Quigley (1991) makes 
the point7 that smoothing may be rational behaviour for appraisers given that observed 
transaction prices may be noisy signals of underlying fundamental value.  Moreover, since 
the focus of the study here is relative price differences across times and zones, the Lonja 
values form a consistent set of indicators for our purpose. 
 
Lonja (2010) uses a classification of its zones according to the expected or dominant use for 
the appraised land but they do not cover the entire urbanized area of the city, as we can see in 
Map 1. This is because they consider that their 129 zones are representative of all the city 
land uses and those areas which are the most active real estate markets.  
 
Because of the lack of spatial coverage of this source of information, extreme differences and 
over-representation of high income residential and commercial areas, we cannot use the 
                                                            
5 We may add that this source of information might slightly differ from cadastral registries because it is 
commercially oriented. In this sense it is thought to be a more accurate approach to yearly market dynamics, 
as recognized by local researchers on the subject (see e.g. Jaramillo, 2004).  
6    For  recent  reviews  of  the  appraisal  smoothing  issue  see,  for  example,  Bond  et  al.  (2012) who  provide 
evidence that index level smoothing overstates the extent of smoothing at individual property level, or Lizieri 
et al. (2012) who discuss the time‐varying nature of smoothing processes, as do Cho et al. (2014) who argue 
that on average smoothing is close to zero but increases sharply in extreme market environments.  
7  A point largely ignored in the subsequent literature.  
Lonja information directly. Furthermore, much of the additional information required for 
modelling is available consistently at Spatial Planning Unit (UPZ) level.  The prices are thus 
spatially averaged over the UPZs and represented in Map 2 for two years: 2000 and 20108. 
 
[Map 2 about here] 
 
In Map 2 it can be seen that while we still do not reach 100% spatial coverage, this 
characteristic has increased relative to Map 1. The averaging process has also moderated the 
influence of extreme values as they are now embedded within the average for larger spatial 
units. We have a spatial panel structure for 86 UPZs in the period 2000-20109. 
 
4.2 Value Capture 
 
Not all of the UPZs in the city have been subject to the LVDT charge because operation of 
the legal procedure to create the capture zones has been slow. The City Planning Department 
(SDP) created a special section to appraise the properties and calculate the tax, and every case 
so treated was publicly presented on their website. A summary of the cases can be consulted 
for 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 200810.  
 
There are no explicit published selection criteria for where planning authorities chose value-
capture cases and the corresponding UPZs, for in the long term it is expected that the entire 
city will be included in the strategy. We represent this variable in Map 4 where the spatial 
randomness of the year when each UPZ was brought into the strategy can be appreciated. The 
UPZs  covered every year increased from 12 in 2004, to 30 in 2005, 39 in 2006, 41 in 2007 
and 42 in 2008 and onwards11.  
 
                                                            
8 This strategy has also been used by local researchers when using this information source (Garza, 2005). 
9 The city-average land price time series resulting from these prices per UPZs follows an extremely similar 
pattern to the city-average calculated directly from the Lonja information, even though the series from the 
averaged prices per UPZs shows values about half those of the one that directly averages Lonja zones. This is 
a good characteristic of the information per UPZ, as it has almost identical land prices trends and mean 
deviations but moderates the number of high-price cross-sectional units in a panel estimation.  
10 During the years 2009-10, the strategy remained in operation and we had access to the aggregate amounts 
collected. However, the specific cases were not publicly presented on the website of SDP. We are forced to 
assume that the UPZs under the strategy remained the same, which does not seem unrealistic, given the 
deceleration in the incorporation of UPZs into the strategy. Compare the change from 12 to 39 in 2004-2006, 
with 39 to 42 in 2006-2008 
11 The Moran’s I (0.127) of the year of adoption of value-capture per UPZ was non-significant (p-value = 
0.322). This is another way to approach its spatial randomness. 
[Map 4 about here] 
 
The tax rate also changed over time, increasing from 30% in 2004, to 40% in 2005, and 50% 
from 2006 onwards. For analytical purposes, the onset of charging the tax in a UPZ must 
cause its incorporation into developers’ and land owners’ balance sheets and, if the theory is 
correct, it will force the former to diminish their willingness to pay land rent and the latter 
will have to accept this reduction. In addition, in equation (4) the higher the rate the greater 
the impact, so a negative relationship is expected between the LVDT rate ሺ߬௜௧ሻ and land 
prices.  
 
4.3 Other theory-driven variables 
 
These are the other variables that are included in the equation (4) and where we have an a 
priori expected sign of their effect on the land prices. These variables are:  
 
Building Output Following equation (4), we need the building output per UPZ ݅ and period 
ݐ. We will use the total amount of square metres built as reported in the yearly construction 
census from 2000 to 2010, available in the section Inventario Estadistico of the SDP website. 
This variable represents the Building Output per UPZ and per year, a variable that very much 
resembles ݍ௜௧ in equation (4). Map 3 shows this information spatially for the years 2000 and 
201012.  
 
[Map 3 about here] 
 
Floor-to-Area ratio (FAR): We use the cadastral database of the city for the year 2009, 
composed of 887,778 plots of land. The information includes land and built area per plot, so 
that we can calculate the FARs per block, for the 44,535 blocks in the city. This information 
is then averaged per UPZ so that it is compatible with the land prices database and used as a 
cross-section variable in the estimation of equation (4). We expect it to be positively 
associated with land price. 
 
                                                            
12 It is worth considering that the construction census is carried out on both formal and informal development 
sites, when they reach a size that can be visually detected by census bureau inspectors (both street level and with 
aero photographs). Because of these characteristics, the information proxies well the building output, regardless 
being a city with some degree of informal development. 
Land Availability: This is the relative abundance of non-used land per UPZ as a proxy for 
ܮ௜௧ in equation (4). We will use the Urban Fill, defined as the ܷݎܾܽ݊	ܮܽ݊݀ ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ	ܮܽ݊݀⁄  per 
UPZ as presented for the year 2000 in the website of SDP. This variable will be weighted by 
the population in each zone in each year divided by its own level in 201013: 
ܲ݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ ܲ݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊௜,ଶ଴ଵ଴⁄ . The resulting variable will be named Urban Fill per 
Population (UFP) and, in order to produce the Land Availability variable of equation (4), we 
will use ሺ1 െ ܷܨܲሻ. We expect it to be negatively associated with land price. 
 
Distance: In order to proxy the differential land rents structure of the city, we use a land price 
gradient as extracted from traditional urban land economics theory, and also a cubic spline 
function (Muniz et al., 2003). This approach relies on the idea that Bogota seems to be 
changing its land prices spatial structure, from a traditionally mono-centric (Villamizar, 
1981), to a moving mono-centric (Roda, 1999), and then a proper poly-centric structure 
(Avendaño and Henriquez, 2012). The CBD in our land price gradient estimations is the High 
Building District located in the traditional downtown. The knots for estimating cubic spline 
price functions for each one of the UPZs will be the two closest sub-centres as identified by 
the 2000 Master Plan. 
 
Built Environment Price: The element ሺ ௜ܲ௧ െ ܿ௧ሻ in equation (4), requires information about 
built environment prices per UPZ and period, and construction costs which we consider 
common to all the construction industry in the city. However, it was impossible to assemble a 
data series of built environment or at least housing prices that can be exactly comparable with 
the land prices structure per UPZs as already defined. The best approach we have been able 
to produce is by using the Newly Built Housing prices per m2 per UPZ extracted from the 
local housing journal: La Guía Inmobiliaria.  This source has also been used by authors like 
Garza (2007), and by the National Economic Advisory Department (DNP) to build their non-
spatial Newly Built Housing Prices Index per cities. The journal has a homogenous structure 
of its adverts, with prices and sizes of typical units in newly built housing projects in the city 
on a monthly basis and without discontinuities since 1992. We collected 17,522 adverts for 
the period 2000-2010. Unfortunately not all the UPZs report housing prices in all of the 
years, making it impossible to calculate the element ሺ ௜ܲ௧ െ ܿ௧ሻ. In addition, there is no 
necessary coincide of UPZs with house price information in all years with the ones that report 
                                                            
13 The smallest available spatial units with population information per year are the so-called localidades. The 
city is divided into nineteen of them, and they contain all the UPZs. 
land prices in Map 2 and vice-versa. For this reason we will use this variable only when both 
databases report information for each one of the UPZs.  
 
4.4 Control Variables 
 
Other spatial and panel variables have been added to the analysis in order to fulfil the role of 
controls. These variables are described below, together with their expected impact on land 
prices.  
 
Home Burglary: This variable has been calculated yearly per Localidad, which was the 
smallest spatial unit with information available. It is the total amount of burglaries per 
Localidad divided by the population, in order to reflect the relative safety hazard per 
geographical area and period, and it should have a negative impact on land prices. The source 
is Observatorio de Seguridad from the website of the Bogota Chamber of Commerce. This 
tends to be higher in the impoverished south and western peripheries than in higher income 
neighbourhoods. 
 
Estrato: This is the spatial classification of the neighbourhood conditions according to the 
National Census, and determines the rates used when pricing public utilities in different 
zones. The city (and the country) is divided into six estratos, defined by the characteristics of 
the façade of the buildings and the neighbouring amenities and facilities. The lowest status 
estrato is one and the highest is six. This variable has been included as the average urban 
surface of the UPZs in each one of the estratos. It is, in this sense, a pure cross-section 
geographically weighted average per UPZ, and we expect higher status Estratos to be  
positively associated with land prices.  
 
Planning Controls We will use the percentage urban area ruled as belong in certain use or 
treatment by the corresponding zoning ordinances per UPZ according to the Master Plan 
2000. We do not know a priori the expected sign of the effect of these variables on the land 
prices, and because of this reason they will be introduced as pure regression controls 
following stepwise selection procedures. According to the Master Plan 2000, development 
(or its absence) in different areas of the city was going to be driven by two types of actions: 
Treatments and Zoning. 
Treatments: Policy actions to encourage or forbid development per block and/or 
block fraction. In some cases they include specific infrastructure investments and/or 
micro-planning strategies such as property tax amnesties: Consolidation, 
Recuperation, Special Urban Areas, Development, Betterment, and Re-Development.  
Zoning: Traditional planning tool that determines land uses per block and/or block 
fraction: Residential, Industrial and Warehouse, Facilities, Commerce and Services, 
Central Core, Integral Urban Area, Mining – Leather, Green Areas.  
 
A summary of the variables, original sources, and adaptation process to a panel structure is 
presented in Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the variables are presented in Table 2.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
 
5. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND TESTS 
 
Equation (4) describes a panel structure where some of the UPZs applied the LVDT from 
2004 onwards. This structure resembles a policy change analysis, which implies use of a 
Difference in Differences (DiD) estimation.  
 
Unfortunately the DiD analysis requires no variation of the units with and without policy 
during the period of analysis, and this characteristic does not hold for our database; the UPZs 
with the policy vary per period. Thus we focus instead on panel estimations with and without 
spatial controls.  
 
Spatial panel estimations have been gaining importance in urban economic analyses, 
regardless of intellectual disagreements about the correct specification of the spatial controls. 
The reason is that in correctly specified models, these spatial effects are expected to capture 
non-theoretical spatial interrelationships while leaving untouched the theoretically expected 
relationships between the variables.  
 
5.1 Spatially and Non-Spatially Controlled Panels 
 A non-spatial specification of the panel model suggested by Equation (4), including control 
variables, is presented in Equation 5: 
 
 ܮܽ݊݀	ܲݎ݅ܿ݁௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߠܦ௜ ൅ ߜ ௜ܻ௧ ൅ ߤ௜௧      (5)
 
where the land price per UPZ is a function of ௜ܺ௧ explanatory variables per UPZ as already 
defined in equation (4), ܦ௜ are distance related variables, ௜ܻ௧ are control variables, and ߤ௜௧ the 
vector of panel error terms. 
 
As we already know that the land price spatial distribution must be explained by theoretically 
driven mono-centric or cubic-spline price functions, we will not use spatial lags of the land 
prices as spatial controls in our panel estimation. However, as we do not know the structure 
of the remaining spatial impacts between UPZs, it is prudent to use spatial panel error terms. 
This is because spatial lags might interfere with the already defined spatial structure or be 
redundant, while spatial errors capture the spatial land prices variation not due to mono-
centric or cubic-spline price functions (La Sage and Pace, 2009). 
 
The type of estimation presented is a Spatial Error Model (SEM) which, when used in a panel 
context, requires a time-expanded version of the spatial matrix ேܹ. The one used is that 
produced by the Kronecker product, pre-multiplying it by the ܶ number of periods: ே்ܹ ൌ
ܫ்⨂ ேܹ. Another particularity of the panel SEM is that the errors may have time, space, and 
time-space variation. This then requires the assumption that the spatial effects remain 
constant across time, making it impossible to use fixed or random effects panel estimation. In 
fact, as some of the independent variables (FAR, distance, planning) are purely cross-
sectional, it would be impossible to estimate a fixed effects model and consequently there 
would also be no comparison model for a random effects estimation (Anselin et al., 2008). 
 
Given these characteristics we can proceed to a direct representation of the errors by 
considering that their covariance between two different zones is a direct function of the 
geographical distance that separates them:  
 ܧൣߝ௜௝ߝ௜௝൧ ൌ ߪଶ݂൫݀௜௝൯                                          (6)
 
Where ߪଶ	is variance, ݀௜௝ the distances between every pair of UPZs, and ݂ is an unknown 
distance-decaying association function that relates them. The most general (and simple) panel 
SEM estimation assumes a linear relationship between the panel errors mediated by the 
spatial weights matrix (Anselin et al., 2008):  
 ܮܽ݊݀	ܲݎ݅ܿ݁௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߠܦ௜ ൅ ߜ ௜ܻ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ 
ߝ௜௧ ൌ ߩ ே்ܹߝ௜௧ ൅ ߤ௜௧ 
     (7)
 
The corresponding estimation is performed for the 86 UPZs where all the information 
available could be used simultaneously; we also add land prices for 1999 in order to generate 
the element ሺݎ௜௧ െ ݎ௜௧ିଵሻ for 2000. In this section, we do not use the variable ݈݊ሺ ௜ܲ௧ െ ܿ௧ሻ or 
its simplified form as Housing Prices, due to the already explained lack of coincident 
information per UPZs and years between this variable and Land Prices. It will be used in the 
next section as a corroboration of the general results. 
 
According to equation (4), natural logarithms of all the variables are used and all the 
relationships can be interpreted as elasticities. LVDT Rate, Land Availability, and Planning 
Variables include non-transformable zero values and their relationship with Land Price are 
log-linear. 
 
According to La Sage and Pace (2009), in the estimation of any spatially lagged model we 
need to use Full Maximum Likelihood estimation (FML), because of the spatial correlation of 
the errors. The results for six different model specifications are reported in Table 3. The 
selection of the planning controls (treatments and uses) variables was made following a 
stepwise procedure using the four with the best fit in each one of the models. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
In Table 3 the models P1 to P3 do not use spatial errors, while models P4 to P6 introduce 
them. In both groups of models we include options with and without differential land rents 
functions (gradient and cubic-spline)14. 
 
                                                            
14 These distance parameters were always significant and had their expected signs. Outputs without controls and 
zoning controls, exclusion of other variables, and the yearly price difference produced broadly similar results 
in all the specifications, but are not included here due to space constraints. These can be provided upon 
request by the authors.  
The LVDT rate impact was always negative and significant in all of the models in Table 3, 
regardless of specification. This result is evidence of static market-neutrality, while Building 
Output, FAR, Land Availability, and Price Difference had their expected signs and were 
always significant. The test of redundant variables never rejected the use of these variables in 
each specification. 
 
We can approximate the relative impact of the LVDT rate on land prices by calculating the 
combined effect of the increasing Price Difference and the decreasing LVDT rate on each 
UPZ price. The effect was a land price decrease of between 18% and 25% in the different 
specifications. This does seem a reasonable LVDT rate effect, as the tax rate ranged between 
30% and 50% during the research period, and we already discussed above that the Price 
Difference in equation (4) is higher than the pure land value increase due to public 
intervention. This value seems reasonable when compared to our most immediate academic 
reference, Ihlandfeldt and Shauggnessy (2004), who found that in Dade County each $1 of 
Impact Fee decreased land prices by approximately $1. Our estimation however falls short of 
Borrero (2007) who found LVDT application negative impacts of even 200% on price change 
in Bogota, a difference that we accrue to our more compelling spatial and temporal 
specification. 
 
By following Akaike and Schwartz criteria, the favoured models are P3 and P6, where the 
cubic-spline price function was used. Models P2 and P5, both with a traditional price gradient 
also performed well. The results show that the spatial errors effect was positive and 
significant and did not control any of the other variables.  
 
In spite of these good results, we must recognize that Building Output might have an 
important degree of endogeneity to Land Price, precisely mediated by the LVDT. This is an 
important discussion as, according with Rose (1973, 1976), even a well-designed LVDT may 
accelerate or decelerate development timing and consequently, the Building Output. 
 
In order to overcome this potential endogeneity problem we will perform a system estimation 
of the test. Solving the Equation (4) for Building Output and replacing ݈݊ሺ∆ݎ௜ሻ with ݈݊ሺ∆ݍ௜ሻ, 
we have: 
 ݈݊ݍ௜௧ ൌ ݈݊ݎ௜௧ െ ݈݊ሺ ௜ܲ௧ െ ܿ௧ሻ െ ݈݊ܨܣܴ௜ ൅ ݈݊ܮ௜௧ ൅ ݈݊ܦ௜ െ ݈݊߬௜௧ ൅ ݈݊ሺ∆ݍ௜௧ሻ       (8)
 
Equation (8) might have collinearity problems when used in a system context together with 
equation (4). Therefore, we use spatial lags of all the other theory-driven variables (Land 
Price, FAR, Land Availability), except for the tested LVDT Rate. This results in the 
following System Panel SEM: 
 
 ܤݑ݈݅݀݅݊݃	ܱݑݐ݌ݑݐ௜௧ ൌ ߛ ൅ ߣ ே்ܹܼ௜௧ ൅ ߭௜௧ 
ܮܽ݊݀	ܲݎ݅ܿ݁௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߠܦ௜ ൅ ߜ ௜ܻ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ 
ߝ௜௧ ൌ ߩ ே்ܹߝ௜௧ ൅ ߤ௜௧ 
                            (9)
 
where the Building Output equation has the ܼ௜௧ variables presented in equation 8, and then its 
predicted value is introduced within the ௜ܺ௧ variables for the Land Price equation. ߭௜௧ are the 
panel error terms of the Building Output equation, but only the ߝ௜௧ panel error terms of the 
Land Price equation will be used in the SEM estimations. 
 
The results using System Panel SEM are presented in Table 4. Once again models S1 to S3 
do not have spatial errors, while models S4 to S6 use them.  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
The main results from Table 3 hold in Table 4; once again models S3 and S6, using the 
cubic-spline price function, are favoured when using Akaike and Schwartz criteria. The 
LVDT rate impact on Land Prices was negative and significant in all the specifications, while 
Building Output, FAR, Land Availability and Price Difference were always significant and 
had their expected signs. The impact of the LVDT rate on prices ranged from 21% to 30%, 
similar to the single equation results, but increasing in accuracy. 
 
Another result that holds in Table 4 is the neutrality of the spatial errors, because they were 
always positive and significant but did not alter the other variables’ signs or significance. We 
can assert that the negative impact of the LVDT on Land Prices implies its dynamic-
neutrality, because its effect on Building Output has already been discounted in the system 
estimation. At the same time all the other theoretically expected relationships are holding, 
evidence that this model of the Bogota spatial-temporal urban land market 2000-2010 is 
reasonably good as an estimation framework for assessment. 
 5.2 Spatially and Non-Spatially Controlled Unbalanced Panels   
 
As already explained, it was impossible to assemble a database of housing or built 
environment prices per UPZs that could be fully comparable for all of the years with the Land 
Prices information and with the construction costs. This is why in order to use the element 
݈݊ ௜ܲ௧ from Equation (4) we will have to estimate an unbalanced panel. The problem with the 
inclusion of this variable is that, not only that we will lose some of the panel observations, 
but that we will have to deal with an unbalanced spatial weights matrix.  
 
We need to make amendments to the structure proposed in Equation (7) as, from the spatial 
weights matrix, we will eliminate the rows and columns representing the UPZ-Year where no 
Housing Price was collected. The new estimations are performed with only 505 observations 
and reported in Table 5. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
In Table 5 we can see that after the introduction of the Housing Prices the effect of LVDT 
remains negative and significant, while Building Output, FAR, and Price Difference remain 
positive and significant. The Spatial Errors effect remains positive, and the introduction of 
the theory variables was never rejected according to the redundant variables test.  
 
According to the Akaike and Schwartz criteria, our favoured models are still HP3 and HP6. 
Housing Price was always positive and significant, and it has not changed any of the above 
mentioned results, but it has controlled Land Availability in all of the specifications, and the 
constant in models HP2, HP3, HP5, and HP6. 
 
In order to be sure that Land Availability is being controlled by Housing Price and not just 
rejected by the absent observations in the unbalanced panel, we also performed the 
corresponding regressions excluding the same observations and the Housing Price. Those 
results showed that it is the Housing Price and not the lacking observations, which controls 
for Land Availability. We think that this problem is due to the fact that in the most peripheral 
UPZs, the Land Availability variable is larger but decreasing faster than the city average, 
while at the same time in these UPZs the Housing Price is lower but increasing faster. 
 In this section, we also correct for possible endogeneity between Building Output, Land 
Price, and LVDT rate, by using a system estimation, shown in Table 6. The results again 
support the hypothesis of market neutrality because the LVDT rate impact on land prices is 
negative, while Building Output, FAR, Price Difference, and Housing Price effects are 
always positive. Land Availability is still controlled by the Housing price, regardless of the 
endogeneity correction. Consistent with the prior analyses the favoured models are the cubic-
spline price function models HS3 and HS6; as before, models HS1 to HS3 did not have 
spatial errors, but models HS4 to HS6 do. 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
A pure land tax is an ideal source of public finance; however it is an almost unattainable 
policy because of legal and technical problems. A Land Value Development Tax (LVDT) is 
an alternative that is charged when regulatory or infrastructural interventions increase land 
prices. 
 
The Colombian version of value-capture, (Captura de Plusvalia) is an LVDT. The way it has 
been applied offers a quasi-experimental setting with clearly determined pre and post-tax 
periods, plus time but not cross-section varying rates, and a non-strategic spatial application 
agenda. These characteristics have permitted us to design a spatial panel testing framework 
that resembles a simplified spatial urban land market for a large developing country city. 
These characteristics give a unique character to our research in the international literature on 
land markets, regulation, and taxes. 
 
In order to make an empirical assessment of the LVDT, we took into account the fact that it 
may not be as market neutral as the pure land tax because of its effect on development timing 
(Rose, 1973), or because of its lack of application in all of the spatial units in a region 
(Brueckner, 1986). In fact our case study has this last characteristic, and it has a spatially 
scattered and time-varying application. Because of these characteristics, we could not 
perform a policy assessment using Difference in Differences estimation, but rather use panel 
models to test the impact of the LVDT on land prices. 
 We performed single and multi-equation spatial and non-spatial specifications of the panel 
tests about the impact of LVDT on prices, including and excluding land prices functions. In 
all of the estimations the effect of the LVDT on prices was negative, while the underlying 
urban economy models always performed in a manner consistent with theory. These results 
are congruent with our policy claim that the LVDT is market neutral. 
 
The neutrality of the LVDT was also extended to its dynamics, finding no evidence that it 
changed Building Output in the UPZs where applied (as per Rose, 1973), and nor was there 
evidence of feedback spatial general equilibrium effects on the land prices (as per Brueckner, 
1986).  
 
The first result was produced by using a system estimation, where the possible endogeneity 
between the Land Price, Building Output, and LVDT rate, was controlled. The second result 
was produced using specifications including panel spatial errors; unfortunately their use 
limited our possibilities of trying more compelling estimation techniques (fixed effects). We 
may add however, that some of the variables in the database are pure cross-section and 
already limited these estimation options. Future research on the area would require extending 
the database into past periods, so that we can overcome this limitation, at least in non-spatial 
panel analysis.  
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Table 1: Summary of variables adaptated to an 86 UPZ, 2000-2010 panel Structure 
Variable Type Final Spatial Precision 
Original Spatial 
Precision Source Units 
Land Price 
Panel 
(Interpolation 
2006-2007) 
UPZs Lonja Zones (sets of blocks)
Lonja de 
Propiedad Raíz 
2012 COP$ per 
M2 
Building 
Output Panel UPZs UPZs SDP website Square Meters
FAR Cross-Section UPZs Property Plot Cadastral census 
Private 
Space/Plot of 
Land 
Land 
Availability Panel UPZs 
UPZs and 
Localidad SDP website Percentage 
LVDT Rate Panel UPZs Set of Blocks SDP website Rate 
Diff. Land 
Price Panel UPZs 
Lonja Zones 
(sets of blocks)
Lonja de 
Propiedad Raíz 
First difference 
of logarithms 
Distance to 
CBD Cross-Section UPZs (centroid) 
UPZs 
 City Cartography 
Decimal 
Degrees Distance to 
Knots 
Housing  
Price Panel UPZ Block 
Own collection 
from La Guía 
Inmobiliaría 
2012 COP$ per 
M2 
Home 
Burglary Panel Localidad Localidad 
Chamber of 
Commerce 
website 
Events / 
Population 
Estrato Cross-Section UPZs Block City Cartography 
Spatially 
Weighted 
Average 
(Hypothetical 
range: 1 to 6) 
Land Use 
Treatments Cross-Section UPZs 
Sets of Blocks 
and/or Block 
Fraction 
City Cartography 
Spatially 
Weighted 
Average (urban 
land use) 
Land Use 
Zoning 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 2: Descriptive statistics (946 observations) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Max min 
Land Price 636,830 614,920 4,550,235 122,818
Building Output 231,397 321,748 2,397,892 1
FAR 0.63 0.40 1.62 0.01
Land Availability 0.17 0.16 0.71 0.00
LVDT Rate 0.09 0.19 0.50 0.00
Diff. Land Price 35,804 172,477 2,342,048 -2,217,963
Distance to CBD 7,601 3,796 15,634 1
Housing  Price (n = 505) 1,587,255 850,114 5,057,729 454,361
Home Burglary 83.55 78.58 605.38 2.85
Estrato 2.22 1.05 5.40 1.42
Land Use Treatments  
1. Consolidation 0.03 0.11 0.92 0.00
2. Recuperation 0.58 0.36 1.00 0.00
3. Special Urban Areas 0.19 0.30 0.94 0.00
4. Development 0.03 0.09 0.57 0.00
5. Betterment 0.16 0.23 0.98 0.00
6. Re-Development 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Land Use Zoning  
1. Residential 0.54 0.33 0.99 0.00
2. Industrial and Warehouse 0.06 0.16 0.87 0.00
3. Facilities 0.10 0.15 0.95 0.00
4. Commerce and Services 0.09 0.18 0.77 0.00
5. Central Core 0.03 0.14 0.98 0.00
6. Integral Urban Area 0.13 0.19 0.85 0.00
7. Mining – Leather  0.01 0.05 0.45 0.00
8. Green Areas 0.02 0.07 0.41 0.00
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 3: FML Panel SEMs for 86 UPZs 2000-2010 (946 Observations) 
 
Dependent Variable: Log Land Price per M2. 
***Significant at 99%; **Significant at 95%; *Significant at 90%. 
Standard errors in italics and under the corresponding parameter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11.472 *** 11.984 *** 12.205 *** 11.459 *** 11.917 *** 12.153 ***
0.055 *** 0.067 *** 0.065 *** 0.052 *** 0.061 *** 0.059 ***
0.069 *** 0.067 *** 0.086 *** 0.075 *** 0.068 *** 0.092 ***
‐0.759 *** ‐0.729 *** ‐0.754 *** ‐0.554 *** ‐0.549 *** ‐0.495 ***
‐0.280 *** ‐0.298 *** ‐0.229 *** ‐0.271 *** ‐0.277 *** ‐0.206 ***
0.896 *** 0.887 *** 0.883 *** 0.900 *** 0.887 *** 0.885 ***
0.010 *** 0.010 *** 0.012 ***
Log‐likelihood
Akaike
Schwartz
Redundant variables (p‐value)
Regression Std. Error
LVDT rate impact on price change ‐0.25 ‐0.26 ‐0.20 ‐0.24 ‐0.25 ‐0.18
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Controls
Zoning Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
1.292 1.288 1.187 1.234 1.238 1.115
Land Price Gradient
Land Price Cubic Spline Function  yes yes
Spatial Error 
0.001 0.001 0.001
Price Diff
0.087 0.090 0.087 0.080 0.084 0.080
LVDT rate
0.080 0.079 0.077 0.078 0.079 0.077
Land Availability
0.159 0.160 0.141 0.158 0.164 0.155
FAR
0.013 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.011
Test 
Variables
Building Output
0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.008
Constant
0.144 0.210 0.298 0.143 0.208 0.291
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6
0.459
1.355
‐592
0.458 0.434 0.445 0.446 0.418
1.355 1.274 1.301 1.310 1.207
‐596 ‐544 ‐571 ‐571 ‐509
yes yes yes yes yes yes
yes yes
 
Table 4: FML System Panel SEMs for 86 UPZs 2000-2010 (946 Observations) 
 
Dependent Variable: Log Land Price per M2. 
***Significant at 99%; **Significant at 95%; *Significant at 90%. 
Standard errors in italics and under the corresponding parameter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11.292 *** 12.073 *** 12.031 *** 11.318 *** 12.000 *** 11.995 ***
0.073 *** 0.075 *** 0.083 *** 0.066 *** 0.068 *** 0.076 ***
0.070 *** 0.068 *** 0.088 *** 0.077 *** 0.076 *** 0.094 ***
‐0.742 *** ‐0.793 *** ‐0.728 *** ‐0.530 *** ‐0.546 *** ‐0.475 ***
‐0.313 *** ‐0.337 *** ‐0.265 *** ‐0.301 *** ‐0.304 *** ‐0.240 ***
0.889 *** 0.895 *** 0.879 *** 0.897 *** 0.900 *** 0.881 ***
0.010 *** 0.011 *** 0.012 ***
Log‐likelihood
Akaike
Schwartz
Regression Std. Error
‐0.23 ‐0.27 ‐0.27 ‐0.21LVDT rate impact on price change ‐0.28
3.544 3.596 3.580 3.473
Controls
Zoning Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
3.644 3.635
0.001 0.001 0.001
Land Price Gradient
Land Price Cubic Spline Function  yes yes
Spatial Error 
0.080 0.078 0.078
Price Diff
0.086 0.084 0.086 0.079 0.078 0.079
0.154 0.140 0.158 0.161 0.153
LVDT rate
0.081 0.079 0.079
Land Availability
0.156
0.011 0.011 0.009
FAR
0.012 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.013
0.194 0.305 0.151 0.196 0.299
Test 
Variables
Building Output
0.011 0.011 0.009
Constant
0.149
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6
0.442 0.419
‐0.30
3.732 3.662 3.694 3.682 3.596
0.457 0.456 0.435 0.446
3.737
yes yes
‐1,706 ‐1,700 ‐1,653 ‐1,682 ‐1,673 ‐1,619
yes yes
yes yes yes yes
0.011
 Table 5: FML Unbalanced Panel SEMs for 2000-2010 (505 Observations) 
 
Dependent Variable: Log Land Price per M2. 
***Significant at 99%; **Significant at 95%; *Significant at 90%. 
Standard errors in italics and under the corresponding parameter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‐2.173 *** ‐1.070 0.072 ‐1.982 *** ‐1.058 0.215
0.041 *** 0.025 * 0.054 *** 0.049 *** 0.032 ** 0.064 ***
0.093 *** 0.100 *** 0.104 *** 0.091 *** 0.097 *** 0.104 ***
‐0.073 0.038 ‐0.093 0.012 0.077 ‐0.035
‐0.504 *** ‐0.423 *** ‐0.340 *** ‐0.522 *** ‐0.436 *** ‐0.358 ***
0.614 *** 0.631 *** 0.584 *** 0.630 *** 0.637 *** 0.596 ***
1.017 *** 0.971 *** 0.861 *** 0.995 *** 0.962 *** 0.832 ***
0.011 *** 0.007 ** 0.015 ***
Log‐likelihood
Akaike
Schwartz
Regression Std. Error
LVDT rate impact on price change
1.026 0.858 1.028 1.020 0.824
Land Price Gradient
Land Price Cubic Spline Function  yes yes
Controls
Zoning Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Spatial Error 
0.003 0.003 0.003
Housing Price
0.052 0.052 0.053 0.052 0.052 0.053
Price Diff
0.097 0.093 0.096 0.095 0.092 0.095
LVDT rate
0.099 0.100 0.091 0.097 0.099 0.089
Land Availability
0.213 0.224 0.182 0.215 0.224 0.183
FAR
0.016 0.016 0.014 0.016 0.016 0.013
Test 
Variables
Building Output
0.015 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.014
HP6
Constant
0.664 0.753 0.752 0.665 0.739 0.744
HP1 HP2 HP3 HP4 HP5
1.050
1.159
‐252
yes
‐0.27 ‐0.20 ‐0.33 ‐0.28 ‐0.21‐0.31
0.404 0.399 0.365 0.399 0.397 0.359
1.143 1.008 1.145 1.145 0.982
‐245 ‐199 ‐246 ‐242 ‐189
yes yes yes yes yes
yes yes
 Table 6: FML Unbalanced System Panel SEMs for 2000-2010 (505 Observations) 
 
Dependent Variable: Log Land Price per M2. 
***Significant at 99%; **Significant at 95%; *Significant at 90%. 
Standard errors in italics and under the corresponding parameter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‐2.216 *** ‐1.154 0.015 ‐2.029 *** ‐1.146 0.155
0.064 *** 0.041 * 0.081 *** 0.070 *** 0.049 ** 0.089 ***
0.096 *** 0.102 *** 0.107 *** 0.094 *** 0.099 *** 0.106 ***
‐0.031 0.052 ‐0.048 0.051 0.093 0.006
‐0.527 *** ‐0.444 *** ‐0.370 *** ‐0.544 *** ‐0.459 *** ‐0.387 ***
0.610 *** 0.627 *** 0.580 *** 0.626 *** 0.633 *** 0.591 ***
1.001 *** 0.964 *** 0.840 *** 0.981 *** 0.954 *** 0.814 ***
0.069 0.007 ** 0.015 ***
Log‐likelihood
Akaike
Schwartz
Regression Std. Error
LVDT rate impact on price change
3.052 3.049 2.8403.073 3.056 2.874
0.003 0.003
Land Price Gradient
Land Price Cubic Spline Function  yes yes
Controls
Zoning Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
0.055 0.054 0.054 0.055
Spatial Error 
0.073
Housing Price
0.054
0.103 0.105 0.096
Price Diff
0.098 0.094 0.097 0.095 0.094 0.096
0.225 0.181 0.216 0.225 0.182
LVDT rate
0.104 0.106 0.098
Land Availability
0.213
0.023 0.023
FAR
0.016 0.016 0.014 0.016 0.016 0.013
0.756 0.675 0.759 0.751
Test 
Variables
Building Output
0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023
HS1 HS2 HS3 HS4 HS5 HS6
Constant
0.673
0.398 0.360
‐0.32 ‐0.28 ‐0.21 ‐0.34 ‐0.29 ‐0.23
3.232 3.083 3.228 3.234 3.058
0.405 0.399 0.367 0.400
3.241
yes yes yes
‐756 ‐751 ‐701 ‐750 ‐748 ‐691
yes yes
yes yes yes
0.054
0.773
 
Map 1: Lonja Zones and Land Prices (constant COP$ 2012) per M2 
Lonja Classification and UPZs (intersections) Prices 2010 (and built environment) 
Source: Own elaboration using information by Lonja de Propiedad Raiz and city cartography block level. 
 
 Map 2: Land Prices per UPZs (Constant COP$2012) per M2 
Prices 2000 Prices 2010 
 
Source: own elaboration by averaging Lonja Zones land prices per m2 into UPZs per year 
 
Map 3: Building Output per UPZ (Total M2) 
2000 2010 
Source: own elaboration using Inventario Estadistico in the website of City Planning Department (SDP). 
 Map 4: UPZs with value-capture public processes 2004-08 
 
Own elaboration following SDP website value-capture cases 
 
 
 
 
 
